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CUTCHEMBER v. PA YNE: APPROACHING
PERFECTION IN PATERNITY TESTING
The plight of the illegitimate child has effected a multitude of court deci-
sions and legislative responses over the years.1 Much of the case law has
resulted from paternity disputes to recover support payments for the child.2
1. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding Illinois intestate succession
statute unconstitutional because it discriminates on the basis of illegitimacy); Mathews v. Lu-
cas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (Social Security Act's conditioning entitlement of survival benefits
upon basis of dependency at time of death does not discriminate on basis of legitimacy); Beaty
v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), afid, 418 U.S. 901 (1974) (illegitimate children
may not be excluded from coverage of Social Security Act simply because they were born after
the onset of insured parent's disability); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (fifth
amendment equal protection clause is violated by discriminatory laws relating to legitimacy
where no valid state interest exists); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619
(1973) (New Jersey Welfare statute that discriminates on basis of legitimacy is unconstitu-
tional); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.), affd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972) (section
of Social Security Act that discriminatorily reduced benefits to illegitimate children is uncon-
stitutional); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.) summarily affid, 409 U.S. 1069
(1972) (provision of Social Security act that favors benefits to legitimate children over depen-
dent illegitimate children is unconstitutional); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (judicially
enforceable right of support to children, from their natural fathers, extends to illegimate chil-
dren); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (Louisiana workmen's
compensation statute that denies equal benefits to dependant illegitimate children violates four-
teenth amendment equal protection clause); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (Louisiana
intestate succession statute that precluded illegitimate children from claiming rights of legiti-
mate children is constitutional so long as illegitimate children have right of inheritance); Glona
v. American Guaranty & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (mother of child cannot be
precluded from wrongful death recovery merely because child was born out of wedlock); Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (denial of recovery to illegitimate children for wrongful death
of their mother, on whom they were dependant, constitutes invidious discrimination under
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause).
2. See, e.g., Beaudoin v. Tilley, 110 Misc. 2d 696, 442 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Fam. Ct. 1981)
(husband entitled to blood grouping test in child support action instituted against him); People
v. Thompson, 89 Cal. App. 3d 193, 152 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Ct. App. 1979) (results of blood
grouping test inadmissible to rebut conclusive statutory presumption of paternity of child born
during wedlock); Magana v. Magana, 576 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (child conceived
during marriage presumed legitimate; paternity rebuttable only by proof of nonaccess or impo-
tency); Dodd v. Henkel, 84 Cal. App. 3d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 780 (Ct. App. 1978) (blood test
results not establishing nonpaternity are inadmissible in paternity suit seeking support); Hall v.
Rosen, 50 Ohio St. 2d 135, 363 N.E.2d 725 (1977) (natural father of child not liable for sup-
port if the mother contracts a marriage with another man before the child is born); Hanson v.
Hanson, 311 Minn. 388, 249 N.W.2d 452 (1977) (in divorce action, wife denied support for
minor child where husband provided blood test evidence that the child was not his); Houghton
v. Houghton, 179 Neb. 275, 137 N.W.2d 861 (1965) (child born in wedlock presumed legiti-
mate, but blood test evidence that proves nonpaternity is conclusive); Groulx v. Groulx, 98
N.H. 481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954) (expert testimony that failed to give unequivocal statement on
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Several factors are relevant in determining whether an award of support
should be granted. There are a number of judicially created presumptions
and standards of proof that may determine the outcome of a paternity dis-
pute.3 In addition, various issues pertaining to the admission of evidence are
unique in the paternity context.4
issue of paternity is nonetheless admissible in support action); Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App.
2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (Ct. App. 1946) (paternity of defendant upheld on appeal notwithstand-
ing blood test evidence that excluded defendant as the father).
3. One commonly applied standard is the presumption of legitimacy. This is a presump-
tion that a child born during wedlock is legitimate. The husband of the mother at the time of
the child's birth is considered the father, regardless of whether the child was conceived before
or after the marriage. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 172 (1968).
The presumption of legitimacy has its origin in English common law. Originally, the pre-
sumption was very strong and was considered conclusive proof of paternity. Most jurisdic-
tions in the United States retain the presumption but do not apply it as rigorously as did the
English courts. Instead, the presumption of legitimacy is rebuttable and the burden of proof is
on the putative father to overcome the presumption. Id.
An additional concern with the rebuttable presumption is the weight of evidence required to
overcome the presumption. Some jurisdictions place a very heavy burden on the defendant to
rebut paternity. See, e.g., In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930). Other courts only
require the defendant to rebut the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Ven-
tresco v. Bushey, 159 Me 241, 191 A.2d 641 (1963); Commonwealth v. Leary, 345 Mass. 59,
185 N.E.2d 641 (1962). Finally, several jurisdictions require clear and convincing evidence to
rebut the presumption of legitimacy. See, e.g., State v. Mejia, 97 Ariz. 215, 399 P.2d 116
(1965).
An analogous standard to the presumption of legitimacy is Lord Mansfield's Rule. This rule
prohibits a spouse from testifying that he did not have sexual relations with his wife if such
evidence would illegitimize a child. H. CLARK, supra at 169.
In a bastardy proceeding, the mother has the burden of proving that the defendant is the
father of her child. A common defense in many paternity disputes is the doctrine of exceptio
plurium concubentium. The doctrine stands for the proposition that if the mother of the child
has sexual relations with a man other than the defendant at or near the time of conception,
then the defendant cannot be found to be the father of the child. The mother fails to carry her
burden of proof, therefore, if such evidence is admitted. Id. at 167.
4. One issue unique to the paternity dispute is the exhibiting of a child to a jury for the
purpose of comparing its likeness to that of the putative father. Jurisdictions are split on the
permissibility of the practice. Some courts totally prohibit the comparison of child and defend-
ant. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sarnowski v. Fox, 19 Wis. 2d 68, 119 N.W.2d 451 (1963). Other
jurisdictions unconditionally permit the likeness comparison, see, e.g., State ex rel. Fitch v.
Powers, 75 S.D. 209, 62 N.W.2d 764 (1954), while some courts permit the comparison based
on a limited number of characteristics. See, e.g., Hall v. Centolanza, 28 N.J. Super. 391, 101
A.2d 44 (1953). The better rule appears to be permitting the child to be viewed by the jury
only if the child is old enough to have defined features. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 121
F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
Other evidence that has been held admissible as proof of paternity includes declarations of
deceased family members and admissions of paternity by the father. H. CLARK, supra note 3,
at 168.
The most controversial type of evidence in paternity proceedings involves the use of blood
grouping tests. Traditionally, most jurisdictions have allowed the use of blood grouping tests
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The most difficult issue arising in paternity litigation is the actual proof or
disproof of paternity.5 The burden of proof in establishing paternity varies
according to whether the proceeding is criminal or civil in nature.6 In a civil
proceeding, the plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the admis-
sible evidence that the defendant is the actual father of the child.7 In a crim-
inal proceeding, the state must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused defendant is the father of the child.'
One of the most useful, yet controversial, evidentiary tools in resolving the
issue of paternity is a blood test administered to the mother, child, and puta-
tive father.9 Every person's blood may be classified according to a number
of qualities that are genetically determined by characteristics of their par-
ents' blood.' ° There are numerous systems for classifying blood.1 Each
only to establish nonpaternity. This standard was fashioned to prevent the use of nonconclu-
sive, and therefore potentially prejudicial, blood test results. Such results tend to show that the
defendant was in the class of potential males that could have fathered the child. The potential
class is usually very large and, therefore, the likelihood for prejudice very great. Id. at 169-70.




9. Id. at 169. Clark recognizes three specific issues that must be addressed with the use
of blood tests. First, is the evidence of blood tests admissible in paternity suits? Second, may
the parties to a suit be required to submit to the test against their will? Third, to what extent is
admissible blood test evidence conclusive on the issue of paternity? Id.
10. Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HARv. L. REV. 466-
67 (1958); see also H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 169.
11. There are three systems of classification presently in common use: the ABO system,
the MN system, and the Rh system. Each system involves different testing techniques to ob-
tain a desired result. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 169.
The ABO blood group system is used to classify a person's red blood cells and serum in one
of six categories. The six categories are type 0, type A1, type A 2, type B, type AIB, and type
A 2B. The six classes of blood are referred to as the phenotype of the red blood cell. The
phenotype of a particular child is determined by the phenotypes of its natural parents. Thus, if
a given male does not possess one of the phenotypes that could have been passed on to the
child, then he cannot be the child's father. American Medical Assoc., Comm. on Transfusion
& Transplantation, and American Bar Assoc., Section on Family Law, Comm. on Standards
for the Judicial Use of Scientific Evidence in the Ascertainment of Paternity, Joint AMA-ABA
Guidelines.- Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM.
L.Q. 247 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines].
The MN, or MNS, blood group system is based on the association of two pairs of genes that
appear in the chromosomes of every person. The first pair of genes, known simply as M and
N, combine to produce three variations, or phenotypes. These phenotypes are M, MN, and N.
The second pair of genes, S and s, combine to form three phenotypes as well. The phenotypes
are S, Ss and s. The association of the phenotypes from the first pair of genes with those from
the second pair of gene produces nine possible phenotype combinations. The nine possible
phenotypes, one of which is present in every individual, are MS, Ms, MSs, NS, Ns, NSs, MNS,
MNs, and MNSs. Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra at 267-68.
The phenotype of a particular person in the MN system is determined by applying four
19841
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person's blood possesses a particular type in each of the systems.' 2 By deter-
mining the blood types of a mother and father it is possible to predict the
blood types that a child could have and those the child would not have.
13
Utilizing this procedure, it is also possible to predict the blood types that a
putative father could have and would not have, if the blood types of the
mother and the child are known. 4
The usefulness of the blood test is limited, however, because it is not deter-
minative of paternity, but can only establish nonpaternity. 5 The test in-
volves the comparison of the blood groupings of the mother and the child
with those of the father. Applying the genetic principles governing the in-
heritance of blood groups, it may be possible to exclude a defendant as the
child's father.' 6 If the putative father does not possess the necessary blood
types that could produce the blood types identified in the child, then it is
genetically impossible for that defendant to be the child's father. If the de-
fendant does possess the compatible blood types, the test will show that he
could be the child's father, but not that he is the father.
17
Most courts have accordingly allowed the use of blood grouping tests only
to establish that a putative father was not the true parent of a child.' 8 If the
antisera: anti-M, anti-N, anti-S, and anti-s. The antisera are human sera that contain antibo-
dies that detect the presence of a particular gene. For example, anti-M will detect the presence
of the M gene if the antibodies in the serum react with the blood being tested. If there is no
reaction, then the gene is not present. The absence of a gene indicates that several phenotypes
may also be eliminated from the class of nine possible phenotypes. For example, if the M gene
is not detected by application of the anti-M antiserum, then the phenotypes MS, Ms, MSs,
MNS, MNs, and MNSs may be eliminated as potential phenotypes of the blood being tested.
Id..
The RH blood group system is the most complex of the three commonly used blood group-
ing tests. The RH system utilizes six diferent antisera to distinguish between twenty-eight
different phenotypes, or blood type variations, within the system. The presence of a particular
phenotype in a child indicates the potential phenotypes that the parents must possess. If a
putative father does not possess one of the phenotypes that could have produced the phenotype
that appears in the cild, then he cannot be the true father of the child. Joint AMA-ABA Guide-
lines, supra at 265-67.
12. Ross, supra note 10, at 466. "Human blood may today be classified with reference to
certain qualities which have been isolated by various tests. The blood of all persons has been
found to exhibit one or another of these qualities." H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 169.
13. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 169. See Ross, supra note 10, at 467.
14. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 169.
15. Id. at 170.
16. Id. at 169. "The probability that the blood-grouping test will establish nonpaternity
in a given case depends upon the blood types of the individuals involved, and increases if all
three of the tests are used to the point where it is about fifty percent." Id. at 269-70.
17. Id. at 170.
18. Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 00 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO
Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543 (1977-78). See, e.g., Hurd v. States, 125 Ga. App. 353, 187 S.E.2d
545 (Ct. App. 1972) (only exclusionary blood test evidence admissible); Carpenter v. Goodall,
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blood tests failed to exclude the putative father in a particular case, then the
courts have barred the admission of the blood test into evidence. 9 The like-
lihood of excluding a nonfather will increase with the number of blood type
characteristics tested.2" Historically, courts have relied upon a series of tests
known as the Landsteiner blood grouping tests.2' The cumulative
probability of excluding a nonfather by utilizing the Landsteiner tests is
slightly better than fifty percent.22 An exclusion ratio of fifty percent indi-
144 Ind. App. 134, 244 N.E.2d 673 (1969) (only exclusionary blood test evidence admissible);
Foglio v. Foglio, 13 Misc. 2d 767, 176 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1958) (blood grouping tests conclusive on
issue of nonpaternity); Anonymous v. Anonymous, I App. Div. 2d 312, 150 N.Y.S.2d 344
(1956) (only exclusionary blood test evidence admissible at trial); Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H.
481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954) (trial court did not err in admitting evidence that established nonpa-
ternity in child support proceeding); Ross v. Marx, 24 N.J. Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597 (1952)
(admissibility of evidence excluding paternity in bastardy proceeding recognized under New
Jersey statute so providing); Jordan v. Davis, 143 Me. 185, 57 A.2d 209 (1948) (evidence
admissible under statute providing for admissibility in bastardy cases where tests show defend-
ant's nonpaternity). See also H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA, 219-20 (1981); H.
CLARK, supra note 3, at 170.
19. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 170. See also H. KRAUSE, supra note 18, at 220. See, e.g.,
Simons v. Jorg, 375 So. 2d 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (blood tests cannot be used as
evidence to establish paternity); Isaacson v. Obendorf, 99 Idaho 304, 581 P.2d 350 (1978)
(evidence from blood test results that fail to establish nonpaternity are inadmissible); Dodd v.
Henkel, 84 Cal. App. 3d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 780 (Ct. App. 1978) (scientifically reliable blood-
grouping tests are inadmissible when used to establish possible paternity); State ex. rel Isham
v. Mullally, 15 Wis. 2d 249, 112 N.W.2d 701 (1961) (admission of blood test results that did
not exclude defendant as father constituted reversible error); People v. Nichols, 341 Mich. 311,
67 N.W.2d 230 (1954) (blood test evidence that failed to establish nonpaternity in bastardy
proceeding was inadmissible); Miller v. Domanski, 26 N.J. Super, 316, 97 A.2d 641 (1953)
(any evidence relating to blood tests that do not exclude paternity is inadmissible); Dunbar v.
Dunbar, 191 Misc. 236, 77 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1948) (nonexclusionary blood test evidence inadmis-
sible in child support dispute). But see County of Fresno v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d
133, 154 Cal. Rptr. 660 (Ct. App. 1979) (blood grouping test that showed 47% probability that
defendant was child's father was admissible); Stegemann v. Fauk, 571 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978) (results of blood grouping test that established that defendant in paternity suit was
among biologically possible fathers was admissible); Livermore v. Livermore, 233 Iowa 1155,
11 N.W.2d 389 (1943) (court assumed that blood test evidence that showed defendant was
possible father was admissible).
20. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 169-70; Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 11, at 258;
See also J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 696, 703, 285 N.W.2d 880, 882-83 (Ct. App. 1979).
21. Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho 666, 662 P.2d 538, 543 (1983); Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal.
App. 3d 873, 879, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869 (Ct. App. 1979). The Landsteiner tests are a series
of three tests performed on the red blood cells. See H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 169. The three
factors tested are the ABO, Rh-Hr, and MNSs systems of the red blood cells. Cutchember v.
Payne, 466 A.2d 1240 (D.C. App. 1983); see MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 211 (E. Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; see
generally Polesky & Krause, Blood Typing in Disputed Paternity Cases-Capabilities of Ameri-
can Laboratories, 10 FAM. L.Q. 287, 291 (1976); Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000, 1003 (1956).
22. Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 11, at 258. The cumulative probability of ex-
clusion of nonfathers using the ABO, Rh-Hr, and MNSs systems is 54.50% for black males,
56.63% for white males, and 52.0% for Japanese males. Use of an additional system that is
1984]
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cates that only half of the male population can scientifically be eliminated as
a potential father. There is an inherent risk that a jury may give much
greater weight to such statistical evidence than it should be accorded. 23 Ad-
mission of evidence that a defendant failed to be excluded by a blood test
may unduly prejudice his case.
Due to the low probability of excluding nonfathers under traditional
blood testing procedures, many jurisdictions have enacted statutes that effec-
tively codify the common law rule that permits only exclusionary blood test
results into evidence.24 These statutes protect defendants from the improper
and prejudicial inference a jury could draw from the fact that a defendant is
not excluded as a potential father of a child.25 If a defendant was not ex-
cluded as a potential father, that fact, coupled with the hostile testimony of
the mother, could be sufficient to sway the jury in the mother's favor.2 6 This
result could occur even though the tests demonstrated that the defendant
was only one of almost half the male population who could have fathered the
child. Exclusionary blood test statutes, therefore, serve to filter out prejudi-
cial evidence and to promote the use of a beneficial scientific evidentiary tool.
Most of the exclusionary blood test statutes were enacted when the stan-
dard paternity test was the Landsteiner series of red blood cell grouping
sometimes included in the Landsteiner series, the Kell-Cellano blood test, only raises the
probability of exclusion slightly for two of the groups and not at all for the third group
(54.72% for black males, 58.17% for white males, and 52.0% for Japanese males). Id.
23. For example, where the putative father is a white male, the cumulative probability of
exclusion of nonfathers for that class under the three basic tests is 56.63%. Joint AMA-ABA
Guidelines, supra note 11, at 258. If a putative father is not excluded, then he is in the remain-
ing 43.3% of white males who could be the child's father. In a situation where the mother of
the child has implicated no other potential fathers, the jury could, and most likely would, take
the quantitative failure of the blood tests to exclude paternity as conclusive of the putative
father's paternity of the child. The quantitative evidence would be given much greater weight
than it is entitled to, given the fact that nearly half of the entire white male population was in
the class of potential fathers.
24. See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE § 895 (West 1966) (amended 1981); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-2343 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 7-1115 (1969) (repealed 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.716(d) (1956) (amended 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885-23 (West 1965) (amended 1980).
See generally H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 170 n.76 (listing exclusionary blood test statutes of 26
jurisdictions). Significantly, those jurisdictions that have amended or repealed exclusionary
blood test statutes have done so to include high probability human leukocyte antigen test re-
sults. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 532(a) (McKinney 1983) (authorizing the admission
into evidence of human leukocyte antigen tissue test results).
25. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 170.
26. Harris, Some Observations on the Un-Uniform Act on Blood Test to Determine Pater-
nity, 9 VILL. L. REV. 59, 70-72 (1963). "[S]ince juries are willing to find paternity even where
the tests dictate the contrary, they will be even more likely to find paternity where they have
for consideration test results that indicate merely the possibility of paternity." Id. at 71. See
also People v. Nichols, 341 Mich. 311, 314, 67 N.W.2d 230, 232 (1954) (admission of blood
tests to establish paternity is prejudicial error).
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tests.2 7 The statutes were drafted to address the inadmissibility of nonexclu-
sionary results from these standard blood tests. Recent scientific advances
have increased the mean probability for excluding a nonfather significantly
beyond the fifty percent exclusion ratio of the Landsteiner blood tests.28 The
statutory purpose of preventing the admission of statistically prejudicial evi-
dence, therefore, is no longer an overwhelming policy interest.
One of the recent advances in paternity testing, the human leukocyte anti-
gen test (HLA test), has the capability of excluding between seventy-eight
and eighty percent of all nonfathers. 29 The exclusion ratio is even more im-
pressive when the HLA test is conducted in conjunction with several of the
more conventional paternity tests. One study, a joint report of the American
Medical Association (AMA) and the American Bar Association (ABA), rec-
ommends the use of a series of seven serologic tests that offer a cumulative
probability for excluding over ninety-one percent of all nonfathers.3 ° The
addition of the HLA test to the other six systems makes this exclusion ratio
possible. Without the HLA test the cumulative exclusion ratio ranges be-
tween only sixty-three to seventy-three percent.
3 1
Although the other six serologic tests recommended by the AMA-ABA
study are blood tests, the HLA test is not. The blood is a convenient me-
dium for conducting the HLA test, but the test may be performed on other
body tissues.32 Traditional blood grouping tests are performed on the red
blood cells. The HLA test, however, identifies and types antigen markers
27. See Cutchember v. Payne, 466 A.2d 1240 (D.C. App. 1983); Crain v. Crain, 104
Idaho 666, 671, 662 P.2d 538, 543 (1983); Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 880-81,
153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869 (Ct. App. 1979). Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah
1980).
28. See Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho at 666, 662 P.2d at 542-43; J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d at
702-03, 285 N.W.2d at 882-83; Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 11, at 257-58; Shaw &
Kass, Illegitimacy, Child Support, and Paternity Testing, 13 Hous. L. REV. 41, 59 (1975).
29. Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 11, at 257, table 2. The HLA test involves the
identification and typing of antigen markers that appear in white blood cells and other body
tissues. The HLA test is a tissue typing test to determine the genetic 'components, or chromo-
somal makeup, of a person. There are 23 pairs of chromosomes in the human cell. Each
chromosome carries genetic markers known as HLA antigens. An antigen stimulates antibody
production if introduced to a foreign body. Antigens are produced by genes and are geneti-
cally determined in the individual. Antigens are scientifically identifiable and may be classified
according to their characteristics. By identifying the antigens of a child and mother, the anti-
gen markers of the father may be determined and the father may be identified with relative
certainty. Such a determination is possible because usually only one person in a thousand has
a similar HLA type. Thus, if the putative father and the child have the same HLA type, it is
likely that the putative father is actually the father. Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1230-
31 (Utah 1980).
30. Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 11, at 258, table 3.
31. Id.
32. Cutchember v. Payne, 466 A.2d 1240, 1241 (D.C. 1983); Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho at
1984]
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found in the white blood cells and other tissues of the body.3 3 The HLA test
need not be performed on the white blood cells, but the white blood cells
offer the most convenient access for determining a person's antigen
markers. 3
An important question is whether the use of HLA test results are pre-
cluded by statutes or case law prohibiting the admission of nonexclusionary
blood test results into evidence. Specifically, should the same principle of
evidentiary exclusion that is applied to blood test results based on red blood
cell groupings also be applied to HLA test results that are not based on red
blood cell groupings.
An additional consideration that has arisen with the use of the HLA test
is its reliability given the fact that it is based on a relatively recent scientific
advance. 35 The policy interests that remain to be protected include the relia-
bility of the expert offering the evidence, the reliability of the method of
testing, and the general acceptance and reliability of the test itself.36 The
widespread use of traditional blood grouping tests allows their veracity to be
tested in court by the advocacy process. The scientific principles upon
which traditional blood tests are based may be easily understood and chal-
lenged by the bar and the bench. 37 The HLA test, however, does not offer
such a broad range of coverage and does not enjoy familiarity with legal
practitioners or jurists.3" The HLA test has only recently been applied to
paternity testing and there is little case law to guide the courts in their deter-
mination of the admissibility of HLA evidence.
39
668, 662 P.2d at 540; Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d at 1223; see also J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d at
699-700, 285 N.W.2d at 882.
33. See supra note 29.
34. See Cutchember v. Payne, 466 A.2d 1240, 1242 (D.C. 1983); Crain v. Crain, 104
Idaho at 668, 662 P.2d at 540; Ahmad v. Ahmad, 110 Wash. Daily L. Rep. 1173, 1177 (May
25, 1982).
35. Tice v. Richardson, 7 Kan. App. 2d 509, 510-13, 644 P.2d 490, 491-93 (Kan. Ct. App.
1982) (opinion of expert witness based on HLA test evidence is admissible at trial); Phillips v.
Jackson, 615 P.2d at 1233-34; Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
872-74. See J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d at 702, 285 N.W.2d at 884 (HLA tissue typing tests not
admissible to establish paternity in light of Wisconsin exclusionary blood test statute).
36. Tice v. Richardson, 7 Kan. App. 2d at 514, 644 P.2d at 492; Phillips v. Jackson, 615
P.2d at 1235; Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 885-86, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
37. See generally Harris, supra note 26.
38. H. KRAUSE, supra note 18, at 214; Tice v. Richardson, 7 Kan. App. 2d at 512, 644
P.2d at 493.
39. Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho at 666, 662 P.2d at 543 (HLA testing not in use as late as
1975); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d at 1232 (only two appellate court cases have recognized
admissibility of HLA tests); Commonwealth v. Blazo, 10 Mass. App. 324, 325-26, 406 N.E.2d
1323, 1326 (trial judge justified in excluding HLA results because no reliable information avail-
able at time of decision); Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 888, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 873
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In a recent decision, Cutchember v. Payne,' the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals was confronted with the issue of whether the HLA test is a
blood test and, therefore, prohibited by the District of Columbia's exclusion-
ary blood test statute.4 The court also addressed whether the HLA test
results were admissible as affirmative proof of paternity, notwithstanding the
applicability of the District's exclusionary blood test statute.42 Holding that
an HLA test is not a blood test within the meaning of the District of Colum-
bia's exclusionary blood test statute,43 the court ruled that the HLA test
results were improperly excluded from evidence.' The court's holding was
one of several recent decisions throughout the country that have allowed the
use of HLA test results to prove paternity.
This Note will examine recent court decisions that have accepted the
HLA test as reliable proof of paternity. Particular emphasis will be placed
on the impact of exclusionary blood test statutes in light of new scientific
advances. An analysis of Cutchember will suggest that the court properly
admitted HLA test results notwithstanding the provisions of the District of
Columbia's exclusionary blood test statute. The Note will conclude that the
admission of HLA test results to prove paternity is sound judicial policy, but
that more guidance is necessary for courts to properly administer the new
testing procedure.
I. THE EXCLUSIONARY BLOOD TEST RULE
A. The Trend Toward Instituting a New Standard for Paternity Testing:
The Use of Scientific Evidence to Prove Paternity.
Section 16-2343 of the District of Columbia Code allows all blood test
results in paternity suits to be admitted into evidence, unless the respondent
to the action objects to the admission of the results.45 The practical effect of
(appellate decision accepting HLA test results would be premature). See Terasaki, supra note
18, at 543.
40. 466 A.2d 1240 (D.C. 1983).
41. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2343 (1981). Section 16-2343 provides in pertinent part:
Blood Tests
When it is relevant to an action over which the Division has jurisdiction under
section 11-1101, the court may direct that the child, respondent and the other parent
if available submit to one or more blood tests to determine whether or not the respon-
dent can be excluded as being the father or mother, as the case may be, of the child,
but the results of the test may be admitted as evidence only in cases where the re-
spondent does not object to its admissibility.
Id.
42. Cutchember, 466 A.2d at 1242.
43. See supra note 41.
44. Cutchember, 466 A.2d at 1241.
45. See supra note 41.
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the statute is that a putative father will only allow exclusionary blood test
results into evidence-results that prove he could not have fathered the
child.46 Section 16-2343 is premised on the notion that a judge should not
permit the introduction of evidence at trial that will unfairly prejudice a
party in the case.
In Ahmad v. Ahmad,4 7 the only previously published District of Columbia
case to address the admissibility of HLA test results, the court confronted
the same exclusionary blood test statute involved in Cutchember.48 Ahmad
dealt with a putative father's objection to the admission of HLA test results.
The defendant father contended that section 16-2343 allowed him to exclude
blood test results and that HLA test results were included within this prohi-
bition.49 The District of Columbia's Corporation Counsel argued, on behalf
of the plaintiff mother, that an HLA test is not a blood test within the mean-
ing of section 16-2343.
The court in Ahmad observed that Congress had no knowledge of HLA
testing at the time that section 16-2343 was enacted.5 ° HLA test results are
much more specific and, therefore, more probative on the issue of paternity
than the standard blood tests that existed when Congress passed section 16-
2343. HLA test results can exclude a much larger percentage of falsely ac-
cused fathers than traditional blood grouping tests."' The court noted that
this higher exclusion factor is due to the fact that the HLA test takes into
account a far greater number of genetically determined characteristics than
46. See Ahmad v. Ahmad, 110 Wash. Daily L. Rep. 1173, 1177 (May 25, 1982). Two
facets of the District of Columbia's exclusionary blood test statute are clear: "(1) the 'blood
tests' [meaning blood grouping tests] referred to in the statute are admissible for the limited
purpose of exclusion of paternity; (2) since any other use of the results is of minimal probative
value they can be made inadmissible at the option of the alleged father to avoid potential
prejudice." Id.
47. 110 Wash. Daily L. Rep. 1173.
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2343 (1981), supra note 41.
49. Ahmad, 110 Wash. Daily L. Rep. at 1177. The defendant not only wanted to exclude
the test results, but he moved the court to purge the record of all references to the HLA results
and to enjoin the plaintiff from mentioning their existence. Id.
50. Id. at 1178. The court ruled that it could not find that § 16-2343, "either by its lan-
guage referring to exclusion of paternity, or by contemplation of the Congress that enacted it
at a time when HLA testing was unknown, can properly be used, at the whim of a respondent
who does not like the highly probative results, to exclude those results from an evidentiary
search for the truth." Id. The court noted that the defendant could exclude the results of
blood grouping tests that failed to exclude him as the father, but § 16-2343 could not exclude
HLA results from evidence. Id.
51. Id. at 1177. The HLA test cannot conclusively establish paternity, but the test can
show the probability that a particular male included by the results is the biological father of a
given child. This determination is based upon the frequency of the putative father's HLA
genetic marker in the general population. Id.
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the blood grouping tests.52 The HLA test is different from traditional blood
tests because it is not based on blood typing techniques. Instead, it tests
genetic markers that appear in blood cells and many other tissues of the
body.5 3 The court concluded that HLA tissue tests are not blood tests
within the meaning of section 16-2343 and, therefore, cannot be excluded
from evidence.54
Several other jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether an exclu-
sionary blood test statute prohibits the admission of HLA test results into
evidence. The California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District, in
Cramer v. Morrison,55 was the first appellate court to address the statutory
exclusion issue. Cramer involved a mother's paternity suit against the al-
leged father of her child to obtain support payments for the child. 56 The
defendant father resisted the mother's charge and argued that she had en-
gaged in sexual relations with other men during the likely period of concep-
tion.5 7 The defendant claimed that the mother could not prove that he was
the father of the child. The mother attempted to introduce HLA test evi-
dence to prove that the defendant was the child's father. The trial court,
however, upheld the defendant's motion in limine to exclude the results of
the HLA paternity test.5"
The central issue on appeal in Cramer was whether HLA test results were
admissible to prove paternity. The defendant claimed that the trial court's
52. Id. Due to their extreme accuracy, HLA test results can exclude a much larger
number of falsely accused fathers than would be excluded by traditional blood grouping tests.
Id.
53. Id. The HLA test is of recent origin and was developed to provide a much more
precise matching of tissue types in organ transplants than was possible with standard blood
grouping tests. Although HLA tests are done on white blood cells for convenience and safety,
the test could be performed on other types of cells, such as liver cells. The HLA test can
determine a far greater number of genetic characteristics than can traditional blood grouping
tests. Id.
54. Id. at 1178.
55. 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (Ct. App. 1979).
56. Id. at 878-79, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 868. The defendant was named as the father of the
child at the time of birth and the child has used his name since then. The defendant never
admitted parentage, however, nor did he act as a father to the child. The mother claimed that
she had sexual relations with the defendant at the time of conception and that she had not been
sexually involved with anyone else at the time. Id.
57. Id. The defendant testified that he was away in the military during part of the time
conception could have occurred. He also disputed the mother's testimony as to when she first
missed a menstrual period. Significantly, the defendant did not deny having intercourse with
the mother. Id.
58. Id. at 878, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68. The trial court ruled that although the HLA test
evidence was apparently reliable, California law prevented its admission into evidence. The
court noted that there was a danger that statistical evidence of this nature might have a preju-
dicial effect on the jury. Id.
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ruling was correct because California's exclusionary blood test statute 59 pre-
cluded admission of the HLA results.6" The defendant also asserted that the
prejudicial effect of the statistical results outweighed the probative value of
the results in evidence. On this point, the court of appeals disagreed.
Notwithstanding the effect of the exclusionary statute, the court found the
HLA results highly probative and relevant as proof of paternity. The court
found the results were extremely persuasive for demonstrating that the de-
fendant was the child's father because they revealed a very high probability
of paternity. 6 '
In Cramer, the court reviewed the legislative history of the Uniform Act
on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (Uniform Act). 62  The California
version of the statute allows admission of blood tests only to establish nonpa-
ternity. Significantly, the California legislature omitted that part of the Uni-
form Act that allowed the admission of blood test results to establish
paternity. 6 3 The defendant in Cramer argued that the omission of the af-
firmative proof provision of the Uniform Act indicated a legislative intent to
prohibit the admission into evidence of results of tests such as the HLA
test.64 The court disagreed and stated that the drafters of the Uniform Act
never anticipated a test such as the HLA test at the time the model act was
drafted.6 5
The drafters of the Uniform Act employed language that addressed the
use of blood typing tests. At the time the Uniform Act was adopted in Cali-
fornia, the only standard blood typing tests were the Landsteiner series of
59. CAL. EvID. CODE § 895 (West 1965) (amended 1981). Section 895 provides:
If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence
based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the
question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their
findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence.
Id.
60. California adopted the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity in 1953.
Section 895 of the California evidence code is part of that provision. Id. At the time that
California enacted § 895, the legislature specifically omitted that part of the Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity that allowed the use of blood tests to show the possibility
of paternity. Cramer, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
61. 88 Cal. App. at 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 868. The results indicated a 98.3% probability
that the defendant was the child's father. Id. at 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
62. The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity is codified in California at
CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 890-897 (West 1965) (amended 1981). See supra notes 59-60.
63. See supra note 60.
64. Cramer, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69. See supra note 60.
65. Id. at 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 869. The terminology that the Uniform Act uses to refer
to blood tests is "blood types." The same terminology is commonly applied to the Landsteiner
series of red blood cell grouping tests, and is employed in the omitted part of the model act.
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blood grouping tests." The court reasoned that California's refusal to adopt
the affirmative proof provision of the Uniform Act, therefore, referred only
to the exclusion of the Landsteiner series of red blood cell tests.6 7
The court, in Cramer, also noted that commentators have addressed the
omission of the affirmative proof provision from the California version of the
Uniform Act. Commentators have indicated that the Uniform Act only re-
fers to the Landsteiner classification of blood groups.6 8 The Landsteiner
tests involve blood typing, whereas the HLA test involves tissue typing of
the white blood cells. 69 The HLA test, therefore, is not included in the
Landsteiner series of tests. The disparity between the two testing procedures
is reinforced by the fact that HLA test results yield significantly higher
probabilities of paternity than do the Landsteiner blood grouping tests.7"
The court concluded that the omission of the affirmative proof provision of
the Uniform Act from the California version of that act does not preclude
the admission of HLA test results to prove paternity.
7 1
The second statutory challenge in Cramer to the admissibility of HLA test
results involved California's version of the Uniform Parentage Act.72 In
1975, California enacted the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), but omitted the
section of the act that allowed the use of blood test evidence to prove pater-
nity. 73 The defendant argued that this omission was an expression of the
legislature's intent to preclude the use of all blood tests to prove paternity.74
66. Id. See supra note 65.
67. Id. at 881, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 869-70. The court also noted that persuasive expert
testimony was given to the effect that the HLA test is entirely different from blood grouping
tests. The HLA test involves tissue typing of the white blood cells and produces far higher
probabilities of paternity than blood grouping tests. Id.
68. Id. (citing B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE (2d ed.) § 657, at 618 (the Landsteiner
test is the widely recognized test for determining nonpaternity); B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK (1972) § 20.6, at 244 (blood grouping tests are not admissible to es-
tablish paternity, only to establish nonpaternity).
69. Cramer, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 881-82, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (construing with approval,
expert testimony of Dr. Paul Teraski of the UCLA School of Medicine).
70. Id. at 884-85, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 872. The court noted that there was no requirement in
the law that scientific evidence could be admitted only if it produced a 100% degree of accu-
racy. Id.
71. Id. at 882, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
72. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983).
73. The omitted section provided in pertinent part:
Evidence relating to paternity may include:
(3) blood test results, weighted in accordance with evidence, if available, of
the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 12, 9A U.P.A. 602 (1979).
74. Cramer, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 882-83, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71. The defendant claimed
that since the legislature left out the provision of the model act that allowed the use of blood
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The court, in rejecting this view, explained that the legislature omitted the
blood test provision from the California version of the model act because the
evidentiary problems of paternity were already addressed by California's evi-
dence code and several other statutes, as well as case law.75
The court further noted that even if the omission of the blood test provi-
sion was meant to exclude blood test evidence as proof of paternity, the
omission would only refer to the standard Landsteiner blood tests.76 Cali-
fornia's version of the UPA was enacted in 1975. At that time, the Land-
steiner tests were the standard tests in use for paternity testing. HLA tests
were not in use at the time for paternity testing in California.77 The legisla-
ture, therefore, could not have intended to prohibit the use of HLA tests
because it had no knowledge of the use of HLA tests for paternity testing.
Furthermore, California case law that has prohibited the use of blood tests
to prove paternity, based on the omission in the UPA, has specifically re-
ferred to the Landsteiner series of blood tests.78 The court concluded that
California law does not prohibit the use of HLA test results.7 9
A secondary issue on appeal in Cramer was whether there was an abuse of
discretion by the trial judge in ruling that the prejudicial effect of the statisti-
cal results of the HLA test outweighed the probative value of the HLA re-
sults.8" Notwithstanding the possibility of an erroneous scientific foundation
for the statistical results, the appellate court concluded that the exclusion of
the HLA results, on the grounds of undue prejudice to the jury, constituted
an abuse of discretion. 8 The appellate court noted that HLA statistical re-
sults are based upon reliable data and sound scientific techniques. The re-
test evidence as proof of paternity, it intended to preclude the use of blood tests of any kind for
this purpose. Id.
75. Id. at 883, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 871. The court observed that:
Comparison of the model act with California's statute reveals . . . that the Legisla-
ture left out the entire model code section dealing with evidence relating to paternity.
The omitted section permits the inclusion of evidence of sexual intercourse, duration
of pregnancy, other medical and anthropological evidence, as well as blood test evi-
dence, to prove paternity.
Id. The court noted that the defendant's interpretation of the legislature's omission would
require it to exclude all these other types of evidence, in addition to blood test results, from
paternity suits. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at n. 18 (citing Lee, Current Status of Paternity Testing, 9 FAM. L.Q. 615, 624
(1975); Polesky & Krause, supra note 21, at 291).
78. Id. See Dodd v. Henkel, 84 Cal. App. 3d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(reference to the inadmissibility of inclusive blood test results under Uniform Parentage Act
assumes only the Landsteiner series of blood tests).
79. Cramer, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 883, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 871.




suits are highly probative on the issue of paternity and are not unduly
prejudicial to a putative father.82 Although the HLA results were not 100%
accurate, the test evidence showed a 98.3% probability that the defendant
was the child's father. The court observed that there was no requirement in
California law that scientific test evidence must be 100% accurate before it is
admissible at trial.83 The Cramer court concluded that the HLA test evi-
dence was not prejudicial and the trial court, therefore, had erred in exclud-
ing the results.84
A year and a half after the Cramer decision, the Supreme Court of Utah,
in Phillips v. Jackson,85 confronted a factual situation similar to that in
Cramer. Phillips involved a paternity action instituted by the plaintiff
mother to recover support payments for her child born out of wedlock.8 6
The trial court held for the mother based on HLA blood test results and
ordered the father to make support payments for the child. The father ap-
pealed the decision of the trial court. The central issue on appeal was
whether the trial court's acceptance of HLA test results into evidence was an
abuse of the trial court's discretion.87 Significantly, the results of the HLA
test established to a probability of 97% that the defendant was the child's
father.8
There were three issues on appeal in Phillips. The first issue involved the
admissibility of HLA test results given the existence of a Utah statute that
permitted the use of blood tests for the purpose of excluding paternity.89
82. Id. at 884, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 871. The court observed, "The HLA test interpretations
are not based on arbitrarily assigned numerical probability values or on a statistical theory
unsupported by the evidence. Instead, they are based upon objectively ascertainable data and a
statistical theory based upon scientific research and experiment." Id.
83. Id. at 884, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 872. See supra note 82.
84. Id. at 885, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
Paternity is now determined by the court on extraordinarily flimsy evidence for
which there is no quantitative measure of value. . . . Rather than relying on such
evidence, the law should not ignore readily obtainable genetic evidence that can pro-
vide a precise and objective basis for deciding such an important question as the
paternity of a child.
Id. (quoting Beautyman, Paternity Actions-A Matter of Opinion or a Trial of the Blood?, J.
LEGAL MED. 17, 20-21 (April 1976)).
85. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
86. Id. at 1230.
87. Id. Defendant also contended that the trial court's finding of paternity was not sup-
ported by the evidence and that the effect of the trial court's evidentiary rulings constituted
reversible error. Id.
88. Id.
89. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-10 (1965). Section 78-45a-10 provides:
Effect of test results.-If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as dis-
closed by the evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the
father of the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the
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The other two issues pertained to the reliability of HLA tests generally and
the accuracy of the particular testing procedures used in the present case.
The court reversed and remanded the case based on the two latter issues.
The court held that a proper foundation had not been laid for admission of
the HLA test results.90
The threshold issue on appeal involved Utah's enactment of the Uniform
Act on Paternity.9 The Utah statute provided for the use of blood tests to
exclude paternity, but also allowed the use of blood tests, within the discre-
tion of the trial judge, to show a probability of paternity.92 Although the
Utah statute was not as restrictive as the California statute challenged in
Cramer, the Phillips court's reasoning was persuasive on the issue of statutes
that purport to limit the admissibility of HLA test results.
The Phillips court enunciated two reasons for allowing the admission of
HLA test results in light of Utah's otherwise restrictive blood test statute.93
First, Utah's statute was intended to apply to blood tests based on red blood
cell groupings and was not enacted with any reference to HLA tests. HLA
tests are of an entirely different nature than conventional blood tests and,
therefore, cannot be properly characterized as blood tests.94 The court ob-
served that the HLA test is performed on antigens, which incidentally ap-
pear in the blood, but may be located in most tissues of the body. 95 The
HLA test is not dependent on red blood cell groupings and, therefore, is not
a blood test within the purview of Utah's version of the Uniform Act on
Paternity. The court also noted that even if Utah's statute does apply, ad-
mission of all test results remains within the discretion of the court. 96
experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon
all the evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of
the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is within the discretion of
the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood type.
Id.
90. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1230. The court stated: "We reverse and remand for further
proceedings because it was prejudicial error for the trial court to admit the HLA test results
without a proper foundation as to the reliability of both HLA tests in general and the particu-
lar test in this case." Id.
91. Id. at 1233. The Uniform Act on Paternity is codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-
45a-1 to 78-45a-17 (1965). The Act authorizes the use of blood tests to exclude paternity.
Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1233.
92. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1233. See supra note 82.
93. Id. The court noted that the HLA test results must also meet the appropriate criteria
for establishing reliability of the evidence. Id.
94. Id. (citing Cramer, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 865).
95. Id. (citing J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d at 698, 285 N.W.2d at 882).
96. Id. The court observed that, "[s]ince red blood cell group tests produce relatively
lower probabilities in affirmatively identifying paternity than the probabilities claimed for
HLA tests, the latter, if otherwise admissible, should also be admissible." Id.
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Recently, in Crain v. Crain,9 7 the Supreme Court of Idaho addressed the
issue of the admissibility of HLA test results in light of a statute and case
law that only permit the admission of blood test results to show nonpater-
nity. The trial court in Crain ruled that HLA test results were not admissi-
ble to establish paternity because of the prejudicial effect that the statistical
results could have on a putative father.98 Crain involved a divorce action by
the plaintiff and a petition for child support for her two children against her
estranged second husband.99 The defendant husband admitted paternity of,
and an obligation of support for, the second child, born during wedlock.
The putative father, however, denied paternity of the first child, born during
the time the defendant and plaintiff were living together."°° The defendant
claimed that he was not the father of the first child because the mother was
still married to her first husband at the time that child was born. In fact, the
child was born a year after the plaintiff was separated from her first husband.
The plaintiff claimed that she had not had sexual relations with her first
husband after they were separated. 10
At the trial, the plaintiff mother moved for the court to admit HLA tissue
typing tests, but the court declined.' °2 The trial court ruled that the case of
Isaacson v. Obendorf,°3 and the Idaho Paternity Act,"° prevented the ad-
97. 104 Idaho 666, 662 P.2d 538 (1983).
98. Id. at 667, 662 P.2d at 539. The trial court noted that although there is a high likeli-
hood that a defendant not excluded by the HLA text is in fact the father, such results are not
conclusive. There is a possibility that another member of the small minority of males that
would not pass the test is the actual father. The probability that a defendant is the father
would be given so much weight that the evidence would appear more conclusive than it actu-
ally is. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 666-67, 662 P.2d at 538-39. The first child was born while the couple was living
together but before they were married. During this period, the plaintiff still had not obtained a
divorce from her first husband. At the time the first divorce was granted, the plaintiff's first
husband stipulated that he was presumptively the father of the first child, but he was not its
natural father. Id.
101. Id. at 666, 662 P.2d at 538. The plaintiff separated from her first husband in February
of 1975, and she claimed that she had not had sexual relations with him since that time. The
child at issue was born on February 3, 1976, approximately nine months after the first time
plaintiff had sexual intercourse with the defendant. Id.
102. Id. at 667, 662 P.2d at 539.
103. 99 Idaho 304, 581 P.2d 350 (1978).
104. IDAHO CODE § 7-1115 (1969) (repealed 1982); see Crain, 104 Idaho at 669 n.2, 662
P.2d at 541 (noting that § 7-1115, which has been repealed and replaced by IDAHO CODE §§ 7-
1115, 7-1116 (Supp. 1984), provides for the admissibility of blood test evidence that shows the
probability of paternity). The Crain court's decision involved former IDAHO CODE § 7-1115
(1969), which provides in part:
The Court, on motion of either party, may order the mother, her child and the de-
fendant to submit to one . . . or more blood tests to determine whether or not the
defendant can be excluded as being father of the child.
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mission of HLA test results to prove paternity.'° 5 The plaintiff mother ap-
pealed the trial court's refusal to admit the HLA test results. On appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's interpretation of the Isaac-
son case and the Idaho Paternity Act, discussing in detail the reliability of
HLA tests as evidence on the issue of paternity.
The supreme court noted that the purpose of the rule for excluding blood
tests that fail to establish nonpaternity is to avoid the improper inference
that might result if these low probability blood test results were introduced
at trial. 116 In the Crain case, however, the HLA test results showed a
probability of 98.98% that the defendant was the child's father." 7 The like-
lihood that an improper inference would be drawn with a statistical
probability this high was remote. The statistical evidence was, therefore,
relevant and material to the issue of paternity.'
The Idaho Supreme Court also reviewed its decision in Isaacson. Isaacson
involved a paternity dispute in which blood test evidence that did not ex-
clude paternity was admitted at trial.109 In reversing the lower court, the
supreme court in Isaacson had held that Idaho's restrictive blood test stat-
New § 7-1115 provides in pertinent part:
Testimony and evidence relating to paternity-Evidence relating to paternity,
whether given at the trial or the pretrail hearing, may include, but is not limited to:
(3) Blood test results under section 7-1116, Idaho Code;
(4) The statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity based upon the
blood tests; or
(5) Medical, scientific or genetic evidence relating to the alleged father's pa-
ternity of the child based on tests performed by experts.
Id.
105. Crain, 104 Idaho at 669, 662 P.2d at 540-51.
106. Id. at 670, 662 P.2d at 542. The Crain Court observed, "A thorough review of the
Isaacson case reveals that the Court was referring only to blood grouping tests in its determina-
tion of the allowable evidentiary uses of blood test results. These were the tests at issue in
Isaacson, and the Court in its reasoning expressly referred to blood grouping tests." Id. (citing
Isaacson, 99 Idaho at 309, 581 P.2d at 355).
107. Id. at 667, 662 P.2d at 539. The odds are 140,000 to I that some white male other
than the defendant could have fathered the child. Id.
108. Id. at 673, 662 P.2d at 544-45. The court concluded that HLA tests are generally
accepted in the scientific community as reliable on the issue of paternity. The fact that HLA
tests are not conclusive is not sufficient to overcome the weight of authority supporting the
recent trend to rely on HLA test results. Id. (citing Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d at
873, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 865; Ahmad v. Ahmad, 110 Wash. Daily L. Rep. at 1173; J.B. v. A.F.,
92 Wis. 2d at 696, 285 N.W.2d at 880; Tice v. Richardson, 7 Kan. App. 2d at 514, 644 P.2d at
440, Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d at 1228).
109. Id. at 669, 662 P.2d at 541. In Isaacson, blood tests had been administered to the
mother, putative father, and child. The tests were requested by the alleged father and were not




ute 1"0 only permitted the use of blood test results that excluded paternity.' 1'
In Crain, the supreme court noted that the court's reference in Isaacson to
Idaho's restrictive blood test statute was only to the evidentiary use of blood
test results.' 12 The issue on appeal in Crain, however, involved the eviden-
tiary use of HLA tissue test results in paternity proceedings." 3 The holding
in Isaacson prohibiting the use of nonexclusionary blood test results, there-
fore, did not preclude the admission of HLA test results as positive proof of
paternity in Crain."4
The court in Crain next discussed whether the reasoning in Isaacson
should be extended to prevent the admission of HLA test results that do not
exclude paternity. The Crain court noted that blood grouping tests have a
limited number of variables and are only accurate for excluding paternity. 115
The fact that a putative father is not excluded by blood test results does not
indicate that the putative father is likely to be the actual father of a child.
The danger exists, therefore, that an inference of paternity might be drawn
from the fact that the putative father was not excluded by the blood test
results." 6 The Isaacson decision embodied the Idaho legislature's intent to
avoid the potential prejudice that could result if nonexclusionary blood test
results were admitted at trial.' 1'
The Crain court observed that the potential for prejudice is far less with
HLA test results than with conventional blood test results. HLA test results
are highly probative and can often show a probability of paternity that ex-
ceeds ninety percent." 8 In addition, HLA results can exclude the possibility
of paternity in many cases in which conventional blood tests cannot.' 19 The
court noted that the HLA test is far more comprehensive than conventional
110. See supra note 104.
111. Isaacson, 99 Idaho at 308-09, 581 P.2d at 354-55, quoted in Crain, 104 Idaho at 669-
70, 662 P.2d at 541-42.
112. Crain, 104 Idaho at 670, 662 P.2d at 542.
113. Crain, 104 Idaho at 670, 662 P.2d at 542. "[T]he primary issue on appeal in [Crain] is
whether HLA tissue test results can be admitted as evidence tending to prove parentage in a
paternity proceeding." Id. (emphasis in original).
114. Id.
115. Id. (referring to Terasaki, supra note 18 at 543-44; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 21, at § 211).
116. Crain, 104 Idaho at 670, 662 P.2d at 542. "[The general limitation on the use of
blood grouping test results appears to be a consequence of concern over the possibility that an
inference of paternity might be drawn improperly from the failure of a man to be excluded
from paternity." Id.
117. Id. The Isaacson court focused on the prejudice that could have resulted from the
admission of blood grouping test results that failed to exclude paternity. The prejudice clearly
outweighed whatever probative value the results would have had as proof of paternity. Id.
118. Id. (citing Miller v. Smith, 6 Fam. L.R. 2660, 2662 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1980)).
119. Id. See supra note 22.
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blood tests because it involves a larger number of variables than standard
blood tests. 12
0
The Crain court next reviewed Idaho's Paternity Act, 2 ' which was en-
acted in 1969. At the time the statute was codified, HLA tests were not used
in paternity disputes. Until 1975, the standard paternity tests were the
Landsteiner series of blood grouping tests.' 22 The court reasoned that
Idaho's legislature could not have intended to bar the use of new scientific
evidence of which the legislature had no knowledge.' 23 In fact, the language
of the Idaho Paternity Act refers to "blood types," a term commonly applied
to the Landsteiner series. 124 The court noted that it would be unreasonable
to hold that Idaho's paternity statute, which was enacted to promote the use
of scientific evidence in paternity actions, now serves to restrict the use of
newer and more reliable scientific advances that were not contemplated at
the time the statute was enacted.'
25
The Crain court concluded that HLA test results are reliable evidence in
paternity actions and are admissible as positive proof of paternity. The rea-
soning of the Isaacson case, which restricts the use of nonexclusionary blood
test evidence, therefore, is inapplicable to HLA test results. 2 6 The court
reversed the lower court's ruling and remanded the case for a new trial be-
cause the HLA test evidence was unjustifiably excluded by the trial judge.'2 7
120. Id. at 671, 662 P.2d at 543 (quoting Goodrich v. Norman, 100 Misc. 2d 33, 37, 421
N.Y.S.2d 285, 287 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979)). The court in Goodrich observed that:
The HLA test is based on tissue typing of the white blood cells. This test is far more
comprehensive because it involves a larger number of factors such as antigens in the
white blood cells. It is widely accepted in scientific communities because in cases
involving organ transplants it is used to match the donor and the recipient. Accu-
racy is essential when dealing with the lives of patients. The HLA test is far more
expensive than the standard blood grouping tests and has not been used routinely by
the courts in New York. However, the possibility of this respondent being excluded
if he has been incorrectly named is somewhat better than 90%.
Id.
121. IDAHO CODE § 7-1115 (1969) (repealed 1982).
122. Crain, 104 Idaho at 671, 662 P.2d at 543 (citing Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d
at 879, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 871). See also Lee, supra note 77, at 624; Polesky & Krause, supra
note 21, at 291.
123. Crain, 104 Idaho at 671, 622 P.2d at 543 (citing Happel v. Mecklenburger, 101 Ill.
App. 3d 197, 427 N.E.2d 974, 984 (App. Ct. 1981) (Romiti, J., dissenting)).
124. Id. (citing Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 877, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 869).
125. 104 Idaho at 672, 662 P.2d at 544 (quoting J.H. v. M.H., 177 N.J. Super. 436, 441,
426 A.2d 1073, 1076 (N.J. Super. 1980)).
126. 104 Idaho at 670, 662 P.2d at 542.
127. Id. at 673, 663 P.2d at 545.
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B. Judicial Adherence to the Traditional Blood Test Standard. A Refusal
to Accept Reliable Proof of Paternity
Several jurisdictions have refused to admit HLA test results into evidence
due to the enactment of restrictive blood test statutes.'1 8 Most of these
courts have acknowledged the probative value of HLA test results, but have
ruled that the legislature, not the courts, must change the law to allow for
the admission of HLA test results.' 2 9 In .B. v. A.F,13° the Court of Ap-
peals of Wisconsin considered an appeal of a state circuit court's ruling that
held the plaintiff was the natural father of a child born out of wedlock. The
plaintiff instituted the action for the declaration of paternity, pursuant to
Wisconsin law, 13 1 after the child's natural mother died. The defendants,
parents of the deceased mother, opposed the plaintiff's petition and appealed
the circuit court's ruling that HLA test results were admissible to establish
paternity. 132
The appellate court in J.B. was confronted with Wisconsin's exclusionary
blood test statute. 3 3 The Wisconsin statute permitted only exclusionary
128. See Cardenas v. Chavez, 103 Mich. App. 646, 303 N.W.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1981) (Michi-
gan blood test statute prevents admission of HLA test results); Jane L. v. Rodney B., 103 Misc.
2d 9, 425 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (New York statute allows only exclusionary test
results; therefore, inclusory HLA test results inadmissible); J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d at 696, 285
N.W.2d at 880 (results of HLA tissue typing test inadmissible under Wisconsin exclusionary
blood test statute).
129. See supra note 128.
130. 92 Wis. 2d 696, 285 N.W.2d 880 (Ct. App. 1979).
131. WIS. STAT. § 806.04 (3m) (1975) (repealed 1979) provided:
If the rights of the natural father have not been terminated, any person who claims to
be the natural father of a child born out of wedlock and not subsequently legitimated
or adopted may, within 5 years after the date of birth of the child, petition for a
declaration of paternity. The court may determine by a clear and convincing prepon-
derance of the evidence that the person is the natural father of the child. Any further
determinations affecting the natural father's rights shall be in accordance with the
standards of s. 48.425.
Id. § 806.04 (3m) (1975), (repealed 1979 as noted in J.13. v. A.F., 92 Wisc. 2d at 697 n.1, 285
N.W.2d at 880 n.1).
132. J.B., 92 Wisc. 2d at 697-98, 285 N.W.2d at 880-81.
133. WIsc. STAT. §885.23 provides:
Whenever it is relevant in a civil action to determine the parentage or identity of any
child, person or corpse, the court, by order, shall direct any party to the action and
any person involved in the controversy to submit to one or more blood tests as pro-
vided in s. 52.36. The results of said tests shall constitute conclusive evidence where
exclusion is established and shall be receivable as evidence, but only in cases where a
definite exclusion is established. Whenever the court orders such blood tests and one
of the parties refuses to submit to such tests such fact shall be disclosed upon trial.
Notwithstanding s. 52.36(2) the court shall determine who and by whom the costs of
such examination shall be paid.
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blood test evidence to be admitted at trial. 134 The defendant grandparents of
the child claimed that the HLA test was a blood test within the meaning of
the Wisconsin statute and, therefore, the HLA results were only admissible
to exclude paternity. The plaintiff father argued that the Wisconsin statute
was inapplicable because the HLA test was not a blood test. The plaintiff
claimed that blood was not an essential element of the HLA testing proce-
dure and that the same HLA results were obtainable without using the
blood. 135
The court in J.B. noted that the HLA test is highly probative on the issue
of proving paternity. 136 The court cautioned, however, that the test can
never establish the fact of paternity with absolute certainty. Construing
Wisconsin's exclusionary blood test statute strictly, the court noted that the
restrictive language of the statute was a product of the state of medical
knowledge at the time the statute was enacted.137 Only the Landsteiner se-
ries of blood tests were then in use for paternity testing. The Landsteiner
tests could exclude slightly better than half of all falsely accused
nonfathers.' 38 Since the statute was enacted, however, medical science has
pushed the exclusion ratio up to over ninety percent. 139 The court noted
that the HLA test was the primary reason for the increased accuracy in
excluding falsely accused nonfathers.
The Wisconsin court acknowledged that the HLA test, if used in conjunc-
tion with a series of other tests, was also probative to show the likelihood of
paternity." The current state of medical science no longer warranted the
restrictive approach of Wisconsin's exclusionary blood test statute as en-
134. 92 Wis. 2d at 699, 285 N.W.2d at 881.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 703, 285 N.W.2d at 883. The court noted that "[t]he ideal paternity test would
separate the putative fathers into two categories: exclusion and inclusion with 100 [percent]
probability. . . . The HLA system at present is the only blood test that approaches fulfilling
[the ideal]." Id. (quoting Terasaki, supra note 18, at 552-54).
137. J.B., 92 Wis. 2d at 701-02, 285 N.W.2d at 882.
138. Id. at 702, 285 N.W.2d at 882-83.
139. Id. at 703, 285 N.W.2d at 883. The court noted that the HLA test alone can exclude
between 78% and 80% of all nonfathers. If the HLA test is used in conjunction with six other
tests then the exclusion ratio increases to 91.21% for blacks, 93.34% for whites and 91.42%
for Japanese. Id. (referring to the Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 11, at 257-58 tables 2
& 3).
140. .B., 92 Wisc. 2d at 702-03, 285 N.W.2d at 884. "The Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines
recommend that a total of seven tests, including HLA, be used for routine investigations where
the question is whether a male is excluded as the father. The Guidelines state that it is desira-
ble to estimate the likelihood of paternity when the putative father is not excluded through
serologic tests and that such estimates are admissible evidence in many foreign countries." Id.
(citing Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 11, at 257-60).
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acted in 1935.141 The court refused to implement the necessary changes,
however, and broadly construed the meaning of "blood test" within the stat-
ute to include the HLA test.'4 2 The court strictly construed the negative
language of the Wisconsin statute and prohibited the admission of the HLA
test results to prove paternity. To hold otherwise would have been to amend
the statute, which the court of appeals held was beyond its judicial power. 1
43
In Jane L. v. Rodney B.,'" the Family Court of the City of New York
addressed issues similar to those the Wisconsin court disposed of in J.B. v.
A.F Jane L. involved a paternity action to establish the respondent as the
father of the petitioner mother's child. The mother petitioned the court to
order the respondent to submit to an HLA test after the respondent was not
excluded by a standard blood grouping test.'4 5 The respondent opposed the
motion and argued that New York's exclusionary blood test statute 46 was
solely for the benefit of the respondent. The respondent noted that the stat-
ute only permitted the results of tests to be admitted if the results excluded
the possibility of paternity. 147
The Jane L. court claimed that the petitioner mother was not entitled to
present evidence of nonexclusion of paternity by a standard blood grouping
test. 148 Paternity tests are designed to benefit the respondent by demonstrat-
ing that he is not the child's father. The court ruled that it was the preroga-
tive of the respondent to avail himself of the benefit of the HLA test after the
standard blood test had not excluded the possibility of paternity. 149 The
court reasoned that a respondent not excluded as a potential father by the
HLA test will almost certainly be the child's father.' 5 ° The petitioner
141. J.B., 92 Wisc. 2d at 705, 285 N.W.2d at 884.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 103 Misc. 2d 9, 425 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Fam. Ct. 1980).
145. Id. at 10, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
146. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 532 (McKinney 1976) (amended 1981 to allow for admission of
HLA test results to prove paternity). Section 532 provided in pertinent part:
The court, on motion of any party shall advise the parties of their right to a blood
test and shall order the mother, the child and the alleged father to submit to one or
more blood grouping tests. . . to determine whether or not the alleged father can be
excluded as being the father of the child, and the results of such tests may be received
in evidence but only in cases where definite exclusion is established.
Id.
147. Jane L., 103 Misc. 2d at 10, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 11, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (quoting June B. v. Edward L., 69 A.D.2d 612, 419
N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Geraldine K. v. Elliot D.B., 99 Misc. 2d 720, 417 N.Y.S.2d 182
(Fam. Ct. 1979)).
150. Jane L., 103 Misc. 2d at 11, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The court noted that the exclusion-
ary blood test statute permitted only two things to be established by a blood test. First, the
results could be admitted to show that the alleged father is not actually the father. Second, the
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mother's motion was viewed, therefore, as a request for evidence that
showed the respondent was the child's father. Such evidence, the court held,
is inadmissible under New York's exclusionary blood test statute.151
The family court ruled that the New York statute prohibited the admis-
sion of all inclusory test results opposed by the alleged father. Significantly,
the court noted the highly probative nature of HLA test results.'1 2 The ex-
clusionary blood test statute was construed strictly, but the court urged the
legislature to amend the statute to allow inclusory HLA test results. 5 3 The
court suggested that a better approach would be to allow HLA test results
into evidence at the request of either party to a paternity dispute.' 54
In 1981, the Court of Appeals of Michigan decided Cardenas v. Chavez.'55
Cardenas involved an appeal from a Michigan circuit court on the issue of
whether Michigan's exclusionary blood test statute16 could prohibit the ad-
mission of HLA test results to prove paternity. The plaintiff mother argued
that in a paternity dispute Michigan's rules of evidence' took precedence
over the exclusionary blood test statute.158 The rules provide that all rele-
vant evidence is admissible at trial unless specifically prohibited else-
where.' 59 The court found that the specific exclusionary blood test statute
superseded the general rules of evidence and, therefore, only exclusionary
blood tests were admissible at trial."6 Significantly, the court noted that
results could show that paternity remains to be determined. The defendant benefits from the
former and the plaintiff mother benefits from the latter. Id.
151. Id. at 11-12, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
152. Id. at 11, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The court noted that a defendant not excluded by
HLA test results will almost certainly be the father if other evidence of a relationship with the
mother exists. Id.
153. Id. at 11-12, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
154. Id.
155. 103 Mich. App. 646, 303 N.W.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1981).
156. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.716(d) (1956) (amended 1982 to allow for the admission
into evidence of inclusory blood and tissue test results). Section 722.716(d) provides that "the
result[s] of [blood] tests shall be receivable in evidence in the trial of the case but only in cases
where definite exclusion is established." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.716 (1956) (amended
1982).
157. By order of the Supreme Court of Michigan, the Michigan rules of evidence, MRE
101.1102, were adopted on January 5, 1978. The rules are binding on all Michigan courts,
although the supreme court will consider recommendations for changes or challenges to a
particular rule. See MICH. CT. R. 508 (West 1983).
158. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that MRE 402 takes precedence over Michigan's
exclusionary blood test statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.716(d) (1956) (amended 1982).
MRE 402 provides, "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these rules [of
evidence], or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is
inadmissible." MRE 402.
159. Cardenas, 103 Mich. App. at 648, 303 N.W.2d at 4. See supra note 158.
160. Cardenas, 103 Mich. App. at 648 (citing Pridemore v. Williams, 90 Mich App. 483,
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HLA test results are highly probative and accurate on the issue of paternity.
The court held, however, that only the Michigan legislature could amend the
provisions of Michigan's Paternity Act to allow for the admission of in-
clusory HLA test results at trial. 161
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Blazo,162 ad-
dressed an appeal by a defendant convicted of fathering an illegitimate child.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to have the mother, child, and
defendant undergo an HLA test. The convicted defendant appealed the trial
court's ruling and claimed that the trial court abused its discretion by refus-
ing to order the HLA test. The appellate court upheld the trial court's rul-
ing but acknowledged that the HLA test was relevant and highly accurate
on the issue of paternity. 163 At the time the trial court refused to order the
HLA test, it had no knowledge of the high reliability of HLA test results.
The appeals court, therefore, ruled that there was no abuse of discretion by
the lower court. The appellate court noted, however, that from the date of
its decision forward a trial court should carefully consider granting a puta-
tive father's request for an HLA test."
C. The Necessity of a Proper Foundation.: Analogies to Other Types of
Scientific Evidence
There are several requirements for the admission into trial of evidence
based on recent scientific developments. In 1923, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals decided Frye v. United States,'6 5 which set forth the stan-
dard for determining the admissibility of new scientific evidence. The de-
fendant in Frye was convicted of second degree murder by the trial court and
brought this appeal. The only issue on appeal was whether the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to admit into evidence the results of a lie
detector test.' 6 6 The defendant offered an expert witness to testify to the
487, 282 N.W.2d 363, 364 (1979) ("[I]n the case of a conflict between the General Court Rules
and The Paternity Act, the Paternity Act provisions shall prevail." Id.)).
161. Cardenas, 103 Mich. App. at 648.
162. 10 Mass. App. 324, 406 N.E.2d 1323 (App. Ct. 1980).
163. Id. at 325-27, 406 N.E.2d at 1326. The defendant's motion for an HLA test was
denied in 1975, before the HLA test became generally accepted by the scientific community.
Thus, the court ruled that at the time the trial judge made his decision the reliability and
general acceptance of the HLA test had not been established. Id. at 325-26, 406 N.E.2d at
1325 (citing Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269-70, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 202, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975)).
164. 10 Mass. App. at 327, 406 N.E.2d at 1326.
165. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
166. Id. at 1013-14. Defendant's counsel appealed the trial court's refusal to admit the lie
detector test. The trial court had upheld the government's objection to admission of the evi-
dence. Id.
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results of a lie detector test performed on the defendant. While the appellate
court affirmed the lower court's decision, it ruled that the expert's testimony
and the test results were properly excluded from trial. The Frye court held
that new scientific evidence must be sufficiently established in the relevant
scientific community for an expert's opinion on the evidence to be admissible
at trial.'67 The court noted that the new evidence must be generally ac-
cepted in the scientific community to be admissible.
In Cramer v. Morrison,'68 the California Court of Appeals confronted the
unprecedented issue whether to admit HLA test results. The defendant as-
serted that the HLA test had not been accepted by the scientific community
as a reliable paternity test. 169 The Cramer court noted that the traditional
test for admitting an expert's testimony based on new scientific evidence was
enunciated in Frye.'7 ° The Cramer court stated that three conditions must
be met to satisfy the standard set forth in Frye. First, the party offering the
new evidence must show that the technique upon which the evidence is
based has been accepted by the relevant scientific community.' Second,
the expert presenting the new evidence must be properly qualified to give an
opinion as an expert on the new scientific technique. 7 z Finally, the party
167. Id. at 1014. See also FED. R. EvID. 703. Rule 703 states:
Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opin-
ions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
Id.
168. 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (Ct. App. 1979). See supra notes 55-71 and
accompanying text.
169. Cramer, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 885, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
170. Id. at 886, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
171. Id. at 886, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 873. Acceptance in the relevant scientific community is a
condition to admission of new scientific evidence to ensure that the new technique, upon which
the evidence is based, has been tested for accuracy and reliability. This standard prevents the
introduction of evidence based on a novel scientific hypothesis that is untested and uncertain in
its application. Acceptance in the relevant scientific community indicates to the court that
there is a sound basis for the theory underlying the introduction of the evidence. See also FED.
R. EvID. 703, supra note 167.
172. Cramer, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 873. This requirement assures the
court that the expert presenting the new evidence is familiar with the theory underlying the
evidence and may apply the theory correctly to obtain the desired result. See also FED. R.
EvID. 702. Rule 702 states:
Testimony by Experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
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offering the new evidence must show that the proper procedures were used
so that the results with the new technique are accurate.173
The California court refused to uphold the defendant's objection to the
introduction of new scientific evidence on appeal because the defendant
failed to assert the objection at trial.' 74 The appellate court noted that the
plaintiff, at trial, was not required to adduce sufficient evidence to show that
the HLA test was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community as
positive proof of paternity. The court stated that this deficiency in the trial
record was due in part to the defendant's withdrawal of the acceptance issue
at trial.' The appropriate remedy was to remand the case to the trial court
for a proper determination of the general acceptance of the HLA test in the
relevant scientific community."' The Cramer court concluded that the
plaintiff would likely be able to establish an adequate foundation for the ad-
missibility of the HLA test results to prove paternity.
In Phillips v. Jackson,177 a paternity dispute 17 1 filed by the plaintiff
mother, the Supreme Court of Utah also recognized Frye as the standard for
determining the admissibility of new scientific evidence.' 79 The primary is-
sue on appeal in Phillips was whether the trial court erred in admitting new
HLA test evidence to prove that the defendant was the child's father. The
Phillips court noted that the best indication of the reliability of a new scien-
tific technique is verification of the principle underlying the test by repeated
applications and practical usage.' This is the process upon which Frye is
premised. The Frye standard, however, does not require perfection as a con-
Id.
173. Cramer, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 873. This ensures that proper
precautions have been taken to correctly apply the principles underlying the theory upon
which the evidence is based. This requirement prevents the introduction of evidence that has
been derived from a sound theory but faulty application. Such evidence would be particularly
harmful because of the appearance of usefulness it would possess. See also FED. R. EVID. 705.
Rule 705 states:
Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons there-
fore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts
or data on cross-examination.
Id. (emphasis added).
174. 88 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 888, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
177. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
178. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text for discussion in Phillips v. Jackson on
general admissibility of HLA test results in light of Utah's blood test statute.
179. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1233.
180. Id. The court noted that verification of the basic principle underlying new scientific
evidence and its application through repeated practical usage are the appropriate indicia of
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dition for admitting new scientific evidence.'' In fact, evidence that is not
scientific often falls far short of such accuracy. Finally, the court noted that
novelty should not render evidence inadmissible in court because every new
development must have a first day in court.
182
The Phillips court noted that several elements had to be established for
HLA test evidence to be admissible at trial: the verity of the genetic princi-
ples underlying the HLA test had to be demonstrated; the accuracy and
reliability of the HLA testing methods for determining paternity had to be
shown; the impact of external variables that could affect the HLA results
had to be considered; the HLA test had to be conducted under the proper
procedures and with the proper materials and equipment; and finally, the
qualifications of the expert witness had to be established.'8 3 The elements
required by the Phillips court essentially fit into the three requirements that
the court in Cramer set forth: acceptance of the test, qualifications of the
witness, and the quality of the testing procedures.'
8 4
The court in Phillips concluded that a proper foundation did not exist for
the HLA test to be admitted into evidence.'8 5 One of the experts was a
reliability. Id. (citing People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240
(1976))
181. Id. (citing United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Stifel,
433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975)). As
one writer observed:
The argument that an acceptable inclusionary blood test for paternity must reach
absolute certainty confuses the scientific with the legal definition of fact. Presently,
paternity cannot be proven to a degree of absolute certainty, but the standard of
proof required in a paternity action is preponderance of the evidence. The degree of
certainty generated by the HL-A [sic] paternity test (eighty-seven percent of all inclu-
sionary tests result in a percent probability of paternity of ninety percent or greater)
strongly indicates that HL-A [sic] paternity testing provides relevant evidence to be
weighed by the fact finder along with all other evidence in the case.
Comment, Paternity Testing with the Human Luekocyte Antigen System: A Medicolegal Break-
through, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 511, 526 (1980) (footnotes omitted), quoted in Tice v.
Richardson, 7 Kan. App. 2d 509, 514, 644 P.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1982). There is no requirement
in the law that scientific test evidence must be 100% accurate. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1234
(citing People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 625, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 70 (Ct. App. 1978)).
182. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1234 (quoting United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir.
1970)).
183. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1235.
184. Id. The court considered the following elements important for ensuring a proper
foundation for the HLA test evidence. First, the genetic principles underlying the HLA test
had to be proved reliable. Second, the methods used to apply the principles had to be accurate
and reliable. Third, external factors and influences that could affect the accuracy of the test
results had to be taken into account. Further, the court noted that the actual method em-
ployed in the particular test at issue had to be in accordance with the correct procedure and
done with the proper equipment to be accurate. Finally, the qualifications of the necessary
witnesses, expert and lay, had to be established.
185. Id. at 1236.
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laboratory technician who did the basic laboratory work on the blood sam-
ples for the HLA test. The court stated that the laboratory technician was
not qualified to testify on the validity of HLA tests as applied to paternity
identification.' 86 The laboratory technician's expertise with the HLA test
was in the area of matching organ donors with patients for organ trans-
plants. The record of the trial court failed to note whether there was a nexus
between the reliability of HLA results for organ matching and the reliability
of HLA results for paternity testing.'87
The principal expert for establishing the necessary foundation for the ad-
missibility of the HLA results in Phillips was a pathologist. Significantly, the
qualifications of the pathologist as an expert in the field of HLA paternity
testing were not established.' 8 The pathologist's testimony failed to estab-
lish the general acceptance of the HLA test in the medical community.18 9
The pathologist also failed to discuss the relevancy of the statistical
probabilities presented by the HLA test results. The court concluded that
the pathologist's testimony was "too general, too vague and too unrelated"
to the requirements to establish a reliable foundation for the HLA test
results. "90
The Phillips court identified several other deficiencies in the trial court's
record. First, the plaintiff mother failed to produce any evidence on the
racial or ethnic background of the parties-evidence that could alter the
probabilities established by the HLA test results. The expert witness also
failed to discuss the significance of the genetic markers that were relied upon
in the HLA testing procedure and the frequency of the markers as they ap-
peared in the HLA test results.' 9 ' The plaintiff failed to establish that the
186. Id. The technician's testimony indicated that she had most of her experience in the
area of HLA tissue typing for organ transplants.
187. Id. The lab technician did testify as to the necessary chain of custody of the blood
samples and the use of the samples in the testing procedure.
188. Id. There was no evidence in the trial court's record that established the expertise of
the pathologist in the area of HLA testing for paternity purposes. There also was no evidence
indicating whether special training in pathology or some other discipline is necessary to qualify
a witness to testify on the use and application of the HLA test.
189. Id. The pathologist failed to discuss the existence of any verification studies for the
HLA test, nor did he testify as to the particular testing procedure used in the present case.
190. Id. at 1236-37.
191. Id. at 1237. The Phillips court noted:
Each genetic marker or system of genetic markers provides different chances of ex-
clusion . . . . The white blood cell isoantigen system alone provides a 76% chance
of exclusion. The next 13 systems provide from 32% to 13.8% chance of exclusion.
By using the first 4 systems, a cumulative chance of over 90% is reached; by the first
7 systems, a 95% chance; and by all systems, a chance of 99.27%. In practice, only a
limited number of laboratories presently have the capability of testing nearly all these
genetic markers. The amount of involvement may not be justified by the small in-
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sera 192 used in the HLA test and the sophistication of the testing laboratory
were of sufficient quality to obtain reliable test results. 193 Finally, the propo-
nents of the HLA test failed to identify the number and types of other blood
and tissue tests that were used in conjunction with the HLA test.1
94
With regard to the final assignment of error, the Phillips court noted that
the HLA test is normally performed in conjunction with a number of tradi-
tional blood tests to increase the probative value of the HLA results.' 95 The
use of additional blood tests increases the statistical probability for excluding
falsely accused nonfathers and, therefore, increases the likelihood that a de-
fendant not excluded by the test results is the actual father. The cumulative
effect of all the tests increases the accuracy of the HLA test results. The
court observed that the mean probability of excluding a nonfather through
HLA testing is between 78% and 80% for blacks, white and Japanese.' 96
The use of six additional blood testing systems 97 along with the HLA test
produces a cumulative probability of exclusion of nonfathers that rises to
91.21% for blacks, 93.34% for whites and 91.42% for Japanese.'
98
In Phillips there was no evidence that all six systems were used in conjunc-
tion with the HLA test. The percentage that the expert pathologist testified
to, however, seemed to indicate that several tests were used.' 99 The court
observed that the record should precisely reflect the sequence and series of
tests used to determine the indicated exclusion ratio to which the expert
testified. The court concluded that the admission of the HLA test results
crease in chance of exclusion . . In the United States, tests with a chance of 70%
exclusion can be carried out by a number of laboratories. If demand and interest
increase, the capability of conducting tests with a 90% or higher chance of exclusion
could be reached in a short time.
Id. (quoting Lee, Current Status of Paternity Testing, 9 FAM. L.Q. 615, 628 (1975)).
192. Sera are testing mediums through which genetic markers and blood types may be
determined. See generally note II.
193. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1237.
194. Id. The Phillips court observed that:
[I]n order to make a proper determination of the advisability of admitting HLA test
results in any given case, the foundational information before the court should in-
clude the number and type of other blood and tissue tests which have been adminis-
tered to the persons involved in the litigation and the cumulative effect of the
additional tests on the predictive accuracy of the HLA test.
Id. See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
195. Id. See supra note 194, infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
196. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1237 (quoting J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d at 703, 285 N.W.2d at
883).
197. The six additional systems recommended by the Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra
note 11, at 258 table 3, are the ABO, Rh, MNSs, Kell, Duffy and Kidd tests.
198. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1237 (quoting J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d at 703, 285 N.W. at 883);
see Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 11, at 258 table 3.
199. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1237.
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without a proper foundation was prejudicial error. The case was reversed
and remanded for a new trial. 2"
II. CUTCHEMBER V. PAYNE: THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF
APPEALS LEADS THE WAY TO RECONCILING ANTIQUATED
BLOOD TEST STATUTES WITH MODERN PATERNITY
TESTS
Appellant, Kathy M. Cutchember, filed suit in Prince George's County,
Maryland, to obtain support payments for her minor child, Kesha. The ap-
pellant alleged that the appellee, Joseph Payne, Jr., was the child's father.
20 '
Pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,202 the
action was transferred from Maryland to the District of Columbia to obtain
jurisdiction over Payne.2°3 Payne denied paternity and claimed that he
owed no duty of support to the child.
Both parties agreed to submit to a series of blood grouping tests and to the
HLA test. The HLA test results showed that 99.96% of the male popula-
200. Id. at 1238.
201. Cutchember v. Payne, 466 A.2d 1240 (D.C. App. 1983). The child was born out of
wedlock on February 23, 1974. Id.
202. Uniform Support Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-301 to 30-324 (1981); Uniform Recip-
rocal Enforcement of Support Act, MD. ANN. CODE, art. 89C, §§ 1-30 (1957). Section 30-314
of the District of Columbia Code provides in pertinent part:
Duty of Court when District is Responding State.
(a) When the Court receives from the court of an initiating state certified copies of
a complaint or other proceedings containing the essential allegations of a complaint,
under whatever name it may be known . . . it shall docket the cause and refer the
matter to the Corporation Counsel . . . for such further action as may be necessary
to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant in order to carry out the provisions of this
chapter.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-314 (1981).
Section 14(a) of article 89C of the Maryland Code provides:
(a) Transmission of copies of petition, etc., to responding state.- If the court of
this State acting as an initiating state finds that the petition sets forth facts from
which it may be determined that the obligor owes a duty of support and that a court
of the responding state may obtain jurisdiction of the obligor or his property, the
court shall so certify and shall cause three copies of (1) the petition, (2) the certifi-
cate, and (3) this article to be transmitted to the court of the responding state. If the
name and address of such court is unknown and the responding state has an informa-
tion agency comparable to that established in the initiating state, it shall cause such
copies to be transmitted to the state information agency or other proper official of the
responding state with a request that it forward them to the proper court, and that the
court of the responding state acknowledge their receipt to the court of the initiating
state.
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 89C, § 14 (1957).
203. Cutchember, 466 A.2d at 1241. Appellant, Kathy M. Cutchember was a Maryland
resident and appellee, Joseph Payne, was a resident of the District of Columbia. Id.
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tion could not have fathered the child, but Payne was within the small re-
maining class who could have fathered Kesha.2° Payne objected to the
admission of the HLA results at trial, claiming that they were not relevant
and were barred by the District of Columbia's exclusionary blood test
statute.2 °5
The trial court denied Payne's relevancy objection, but upheld his claim
that the blood test statute barred the admission of the HLA results into
evidence.2 °6 The trial court also ruled that the remaining evidence was not
sufficient to prove that the appellee, Payne, was the child's father.20 7
The court of appeals was confronted with whether the HLA test results
should have been admitted into evidence. Specifically, the court had to de-
termine whether D.C. Code section 16-2343218 prohibited the use of HLA
test results as affirmative proof of paternity. The court reversed the trial
court's ruling and remanded the case for a new trial. 209 The blood test stat-
ute was found to be inapplicable because the HLA test is not a blood test,
but a tissue test that uses the blood as a convenient testing medium.21 0
Although the HLA test is generally performed on white blood cells, the
court noted that blood is not an essential ingredient of the test. The court
also reasoned that the legislative history of section 16-2343 does not warrant
its application to HLA testing. 21' Congress could not have intended to pro-
hibit a test that was not even developed at the time the statute was
enacted.21 2
204. Id. at 1242. The appellee, Payne, possessed the necessary HLA markers to have fa-
thered the child. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. The trial court ruled that the language of the blood test statute precluded the
introduction of the test results.
207. Id.
208. See supra note 41.
209. Cutchember, 466 A.2d at 1241.
210. Id. at 1242.
211. Id. Section 16-2343 was aimed at eliminating improper uses of red blood cell group-
ing tests. "[T]he dangers of statistical unreliability and undue prejudice presented by the intro-
duction of red blood cell grouping tests are not present with HLA results. HLA findings are
highly probative of paternity and not unduly speculative." Id.
212. Id. at 1242. The District of Columbia's exclusionary blood test statute was enacted
before the development of the HLA testing procedure. The HLA test is also markedly differ-
ent from the blood grouping tests that the statute was enacted to cover. Id. (citing Phillips v.
Jackson, 615 P.2d at 1233 (a statute enacted with reference to blood tests based on red cell
groupings was not intended to apply to HLA which is of a different nature) and Cramer v.
Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 869 (drafters of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to determine
Paternity did not have in mind tests of the nature of HLA)).
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A. Overcoming the Language of Section 16-2343, the District of
Columbia's Exclusionary Blood Test Statute
In Cutchember v. Payne,"1 3 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
addressed whether the admission into evidence of HLA test results that
might establish the fact of paternity was prohibited by the District of Colum-
bia's exclusionary blood test statute./" 4 Although the exclusionary statute
prohibited the use of "blood test" results as positive proof of paternity, the
court ruled that the statute did not apply to the HLA test. Like the courts in
Ahmad v. Ahmad 2" 5 and Crain v. Crain,2 16 the court of appeals in Cutch-
ember ruled that the HLA test is a "tissue test" that is generally performed
on the white blood cells.2" 7 The Cutchember court noted, as did the court in
Phillips v. Jackson,2" 8 that blood is not an essential ingredient of the HLA
test, but merely a convenient testing medium for conducting the test.
21 9
Writing for the court in Cutchember, Judge Nebeker examined the scope
of section 16-2343 by analyzing the purpose of the statute in light of the
language, legislative history and practical effect of the statute as enacted.
The court of appeals reasoned that the legislative history of section 16-2343
warrants a limited application of the statute. The purpose for which section
16-2343 was enacted, to eliminate the statistical unreliability and undue prej-
udice inherent in the use of red blood cell grouping tests, is not a problem
with HLA test results. 220 As the courts in Cramer v. Morrison 221 and Crain
noted, HLA test results are highly probative and accurate as proof of pater-
nity.222 The HLA test is of an entirely different nature than the red blood
cell tests that Congress wanted to limit. In fact, the HLA test was not even
developed at the time Congress enacted section 16-2343. The Cutchember
court concluded that Congress could not have intended to prohibit unantici-
pated, future scientific advances such as the HLA test.22 3
The Cutchember court cited several state appellate court decisions in sup-
port of its conclusion that section 16-2343 does not prohibit the admission
213. 466 A.2d 1240 (D.C. App. 1983).
214. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2343 (1981).
215. 110 Wash. Daily Law Rep. 1173 (May 25, 1982); see supra notes 47-54 and accompa-
nying text.
216. 104 Idaho 666, 662 P.2d 538 (1983); see supra notes 97-127 and accompanying text.
217. Cutchember, 466 A.2d at 1242; see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
218. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980); see supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
219. Cutchember, 466 A.2d at 1242; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
220. Cutchember, 466 A.2d at 1242.
221. 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (Ct. App. 1979); see supra notes 55-84 and
accompanying text.
222. See supra note 61 and accompanying text, notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
223. Cutchember, 466 A.2d at 1424; see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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224into evidence of HLA test results for the purpose of proving paternity.
The court's decision is persuasive in that section 16-2343 was clearly not
intended to prohibit all scientific test evidence. As the court in Crain ob-
served, only scientific test evidence that posed a potentially prejudicial effect,
due to the inconclusive proof of paternity from the test results, was to be
excluded. 225 At the time that most exclusionary blood test statutes were
enacted, the standard paternity test was the Landsteiner series of blood
226 Ladgrouping tests. The Landsteiner tests can only exclude slightly better
than fifty percent of all nonfathers. The HLA test, however, can exclude
more than ninety percent of all nonfathers.22 7
The fact that a defendant remains in the class of half the male population
that could have fathered a particular child, as the case may be under the
Landsteiner tests, should not be submitted to a jury for their unrestrained
speculation. The result would surely be that the mother's adverse testimony
coupled with a finding of nonexclusion would be sufficient to sway a jury's
decision in favor of the mother.228 If a defendant remains in the class of less
than ten percent of the male population who could have fathered the child,
as the case may be under HLA testing, then the evidence is statistically
much more probative and persuasive of the likelihood of paternity. As the
court pointed out in Crain, such evidence is relevant to a jury's determina-
tion of paternity, and yet may be weighted by any adverse testimony or evi-
dence that could show that the defendant never had access to the mother.229
The potential for prejudice with the HLA test, therefore, is minimal.
Most courts that have confronted the HLA admission issue have acknowl-
edged that HLA test results are highly reliable and probative as positive
proof of paternity.230 Not all of these courts, however, have seen fit to allow
the HLA results into evidence. 231 Significantly, the courts that have not
allowed the results into evidence have done so because of an exclusionary
224. Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho at 662 P.2d at 538 (Idaho blood test statute does not pro-
hibit admission of HLA test results); Ahmad v. Ahmad, 110 Wash. Daily L. Rep. 1173 (May
25, 1982) (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2343 does not bar admission of HLA test results); Phillips v.
Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (Uniform Act on Paternity, as adopted in Utah, does not
preclude admissibility of HLA test results to prove paternity); Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal.
App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (Ct. App. 1979) (California exclusionary blood test statute
inapplicable to HLA test results).
225. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
226. Cutchember, 466 A.2d at 1241; see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 138-39, 195-98 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
230. See generally supra notes 51, 82, 108, 118-20, 128-29, 136, 152, 161,163 and accompa-
nying text.
231. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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blood test statute.2 32 Like the court in J.B. v. A.F.,233 these courts have
deferred amendment to the exclusionary blood test statute to the legislatures,
rather than intervene judicially.234 As the court in Cutchember noted, how-
ever, this need not be the result.
Most exclusionary blood test statutes were enacted at a time when the
235Landsteiner blood grouping test was the standard paternity test. The ex-
clusionary statutes, therefore, specifically refer to and limit the use of blood
tests to exclude paternity. The use of the term blood test is a reference to
blood grouping, the method of testing common to the Landsteiner series.236
The HLA test does not involve blood grouping and, in fact, need not even be
performed on the blood. 237 As the Ahmad and Crain courts noted, the HLA
test identifies and characterizes antigens that appear in many tissues of the
body.238 The reference to blood tests within the plain meaning of D.C. Code
section 16-2343, therefore, clearly does not include HLA tissue tests.2 39 To
strictly confine section 16-2343 to its specific language is neither a form of
result-oriented jurisprudence nor an exercise of judicial intervention by the
court in the legislative process. The court of appeals, in Cutchember, has
merely construed the language of section 16-2343 as enacted.
B. The Cutchember Court's Failure to Establish Proper Guidelines for the
Admission of HLA Test Results
Although the court of appeals in Cutchember allowed HLA test results
into evidence, the court failed to instruct the trial court, on remand, with
regard to the proper foundational requirements for the admission into evi-
dence of HLA test results. The HLA test is a relatively new scientific tech-
nique that has only recently been applied in the area of paternity testing. 2 °
As the courts in Cramer and Phillips noted, the standard for the admissibil-
ity of new scientific evidence was set forth in Frye v. United States.24' Frye
requires expert testimony based on new scientific evidence to be generally
accepted as reliable within the relevant scientific community before it is ad-
232. Id.
233. 92 Wis. 2d 696, 285 N.W. 2d 880 (Ct. App. 1979).
234. See supra notes 143, 153, 161 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 54, 94-95, 124 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 52-53, 120, 191 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 54, 120 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
241. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see supra notes 165-67, 170-73, 179-82 and accompany-
ing text.
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missible at trial.242
In Cramer, the court applied the Frye standard to determine whether a
proper foundation existed for the admission of HLA test results. The
Cramer court ruled that three conditions must be met for the HLA results to
be properly presented into evidence. The court required the HLA results to
be: (1) accepted in the relevant scientific community, (2) presented by a
properly qualified expert, and (3) accurately derived from proper testing pro-
cedures. 24 3 Although the Phillips court expanded on the requirements, the
basic conditions set forth were identical to those enunciated in Cramer.24
The court in Cutchember, however, failed to set forth adequately the proper
foundational guidelines for the trial court.
The Cutchember court held that the HLA test was not a blood test within
the meaning of D.C. Code section 16-2343 and, therefore, the results of the
HLA test were improperly excluded from evidence.2 45 The appellate court
failed to instruct the trial court on the requirements of Frye v. United States
and the application of the Frye standard to the presentation at trial of new
HLA test results. For HLA test evidence to be admissible at trial, an ade-
quate foundation must first be established that will prevent either of the par-
ties from being unduly prejudiced by inaccurate or unreliable test results.
The application of Frye to the presentation of HLA test evidence, as set forth
in Cramer and Phillips, would provide adequate protection to the involved
246parties.
That the Cutchember court has apparently taken judicial notice of the ac-
ceptance of the HLA testing technique for paternity testing does not in itself
seem particularly egregious. As one court noted, the validity of a scientific
technique may be so generally accepted in the relevant scientific community
that the court can take judicial notice of its reliability. 24 7 Although the use
of the HLA test for paternity testing is not common practice, it seems to be
242. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. FED. R. EvID. 703 codifies the Frye
standard by allowing evidence that is generally accepted by experts in a particular field to be
admitted without establishing the underlying theory on which the evidence is based. Id. The
Advisory Committee Notes to proposed rule 703 state that, "notice should be taken ... that
[proposed rule 703] requires that the facts or data 'be of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field.' " FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee note. See supra note
167 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 209-12, 215-17, 224-25 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 170-73, 179-82 and accompanying text.
247. Tice v. Richardson, 7 Kan. App. 2d at 512, 644 P.2d at 492 (quoting People v. Law,
40 Cal. App. 3d 65, 75, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 711 (Ct. App. 1974)).
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the trend for complicated paternity disputes.2 48 The Cutchember court's
failure to discuss this aspect of the Cramer application of Frye is therefore
not wholly without reason. The failure of the court of appeals to set a
proper standard for the quality of HLA test evidence, however, is harmful
and will undoubtedly cause confusion in later cases involving the application
of the HLA test to paternity proceedings.
249
The court of appeals implied sub silentio that the HLA test results in
Cutchember were properly offered by a qualified expert in the field. Further-
more, the court assumed that the HLA results were derived from accurate
and reliable testing procedures. Although the particular results in Cutch-
ember may have been accurate and reliable, this will not necessarily be the
result in all paternity suits involving HLA tests. The Cutchember court
should have inquired into the particular qualifications of the expert offering
the HLA evidence at trial. In addition, the accuracy and reliability of the
testing techniques used to derive the HLA results should have been
verified.25 °
In Phillips, the court addressed the foundational requirements for deter-
mining the quality of the HLA testing techniques used in each particular
case. The court noted that the HLA test by itself can exclude between 78%
and 80% of all nonfathers.2 5 1 If the HLA test is used in conjunction with
several other systems, then the exclusion ratio increases to over 90%.252 As
the court noted in Phillips, a 97% exclusion ratio indicates that other sys-
tems were used in conjunction with the HLA test to derive the high
probability of exclusion.253 The Phillips court ruled that a proper founda-
tion for the presentation of the HLA results did not exist because the trial
record did not reflect the exact testing procedures used to derive the high
exclusion ratio.254
In Cutchember, the court of appeals indicated that the HLA results
demonstrated a 99.96% probability of exclusion.255 The Cutchember court
failed to note whether this extremely high probability of exclusion was the
product of only the HLA test, or whether the result was derived from a
series of tests used in conjunction with the HLA test. The weight of author-
ity indicates that the HLA test is only capable of achieving a 78% to 80%
248. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra
note 11, at 248; Teraski, supra note 18, at 543.
249. See supra notes 176, 185-90 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 173, 183 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
253. Phillips, 615 P.2d 1228, 1237 (Utah 1980).
254. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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probability of exclusion.256 It is, therefore, unlikely that the 99.96%
probability of exclusion in Cutchember was derived solely from HLA test
results. The Cutchember court should have required the exact testing proce-
dures to be divulged so that the accuracy of the high exclusion ratio could be
verified.
Another problem that arises from the court's failure to inquire particu-
larly into the various foundational requirements is that the court may have
reached a wrong conclusion concerning the applicability of the District of
Columbia blood test statute. If additional tests were used in conjunction
with the HLA testing procedure, the tests would have to have been blood
tests. If blood tests were used along with the HLA test to derive the 99.96%
exclusion ratio, then the court's reasoning that D.C. Code section 16-2343
does not apply becomes suspect.25 7 If the results were derived in part from
blood tests, then section 16-2343 was applicable, and the results were exclud-
able to the extent that the court's holding was based on the notion that the
results were derived from an HLA tissue test outside the scope of section 16-
2343. This unfortunate misapplication of law could have been avoided, how-
ever, if the court had focused on the high probability of the test results and
required that the proponent of the HLA evidence demonstrate that the cor-
rect procedures were used to derive the high probability of exclusion.25 8
III. CONCLUSION
The Cutchember court followed the lead of several other jurisdictions and
ruled that an HLA test is not a blood test within the meaning of an exclu-
sionary blood test statute. The court noted that HLA test results are admis-
sible at trial as positive proof of paternity. The Cutchember court also
recognized the reliability and probative value of HLA test results on the
issue of paternity. Unlike the courts in Cramer and Phillips, however, the
court in Cutchember failed to set a standard to ensure that HLA test results
are properly presented at trial. The Cutchember court has provided no gui-
dance to the lower court for ensuring that a proper foundation exists for the
admission of inclusory HLA test results.
The danger exists that future plaintiffs may offer highly probative and per-
suasive HLA evidence, but the lower court may not be aware of the correct
procedure for accepting the evidence at trial. The brevity of the Cutchember
decision and the lack of proper guidance on the recent developments in
256. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 210, 224 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
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HLA testing will undoubtedly lead to confusion among judges and jurors as
to the proper requirements for analyzing HLA test results.
Kevin L. Petrasic

